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An American Perspective on the European
Commission's "Amended Proposal for a
Council Regulation on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings"
and its Impact on Hostile Tender Offers
Jeffrey P. Greenbaum*
I. Introduction
In preparation for the unified internal market of 1992,1 the Eu-
ropean Community is taking steps to regulate the anticipated on-
slaught of corporate reorganizations, mergers and acquisitions that
the additional competitive pressures of the unified market are likely
to produce. One aspect of this preparation is the Amended Proposal
for a Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations' between
* Jeffrey P. Greenbaum, A.B. Brown University, 1981, J.D. University of Michigan,
LL.M. European University Institute, 1987, Associate, Dilworth, Paxson, Kalish & Kauffman.
The author would like to thank J. Bart DeLone, Alessandra Gianelli, Justin Klein and Harriet
Koren for their assistance in writing this article.
1. For various studies and perspectives on 1992 and the European Community, see, e.g.,
the following publications of the Commission of the European Communities: The Economics
of 1992, European Economy No. 35, Brussels, 1988; Creation of a European Financial Area,
European Economy No. 36, Brussels, 1988; Research on the "Cost of Non-Europe", Brussels,
1988: Vol. 1, Basic Studies: Executive Summaries; Vol. 2, Studies on the Economics of Inte-
gration; Vol. 3, The Completion of the Internal Market: A Survey of European Industry's
Perception of the Likely Effects; Vol. 4, The "Cost of Non-Europe": Border-Related Controls
and Administrative Formalities - An Illustration in the Road Haulage Sector; Vol. 5, The
"Cost of Non-Europe" in Public Sector Procurement; Vol. 6, Technical Barriers in the EC
An Illustration by Six Industries; Vol. 7, The "Cost of Non-Europe": Obstacles to Trans-
border Business Activity; Vol. 8, The "Cost of Non-Europe" for Business Services; Vol. 9,
The "Cost of Non-Europe" in Financial Services; Vol. 10, The Benefits of Completing the
Internal Market for Telecommunication Equipment, Services in the Community; Vol. 11, The
EC 92 Automobile Sector; Vol. 12, The "Cost of Non-Europe" in the Foodstuffs Industry;
Vol. 13, Le "count de la non-Europe": des produits de construction; Vol. 14, The "Cost of
Non-Europe" in the Textile-Clothing Industry; Vol. 15, The "Cost of non-Europe". in the
Pharmaceutical Industry.
2. A Concentration shall be deemed to occur where:
(a) two or more undertakings merge; or
(b) - one or more persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or
- one or more undertakings acquire, whether by purchase of shares or as-
sets, by contract or by any other means, direct or indirect control of the whole or
parts of one or more undertakings.
See infra note 4, at Art. 3 § 1(a) and (b).
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Undertakings3 ("the Proposal").4 The Proposal was submitted by the
European Commission ("Commission") to the European Council on
April 25, 1988. A Revised Edition was recently submitted on De-
cember 19, 1988. The Proposal provides, in part, that in the event
that an undertaking merges with or acquires one or more undertak-
ings, prior notification must be given to the Commission. Notification
gives the Commission the opportunity to assess the anticompetitive
aspects of the concentration during a lengthened period of evalua-
tion. Thus, the Commission will have the information necessary to
decide before the effective date whether the proposed combination is
compatible with the "common market" (compatibility is defined by
the Proposal in terms of typical antitrust concerns) or whether it
might weaken the international competitiveness of European
industry.'
The American Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
of 19766 ("Act"), in its premerger notification sections, is quite simi-
lar to the parallel provisions of the Proposal. 7 Like the proposal, the
Act provides for the prior notification of mergers and acquisitions to
the Premerger Notification Department of the Federal Trade Com-
mission and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department. The
purpose of the Act's premerger notification provisions is to allow the
analysis of possible anti-competitive effects of proposed combina-
tions. The Act contains no explicit goal of promoting competition.
The implications of both the Act and the Proposal extend be-
yond anti-trust regulations; they affect numerous aspects of the com-
plex world of corporate interaction, including the hostile tender offer
- a most dramatic form of corporate transfer. 8 Both can purpose-
3. The term "undertaking" in this context encompasses all forms of corporate
organization.
4. O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 130) 4 (1988) (February version); O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C.
6407) (1989) (Final Revised Version).
5. The Proposal, unlike its American counterpart, provides that combinations may be-
come acceptable taking into account "the competitiveness of the sectors concerned with regard
to international competition." The Proposal states in Article 2, § 3:
Concentrations which create or strengthen a position as a result of which
the maintenance or development of effective competition is impeded in the com-
mon market or in a substantial part thereof shall be declared incompatible with
the common market unless authorized on the ground that their contribution to
improving production and distribution, to promoting technical or economic pro-
gress or to improving the competitive structure within the common market out-
weighs the damage to competition. In this respect, the competitiveness of the
sectors concerned with regard to international competition and the interests of
consumers shall be taken into account. (emphasis added)
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h, 16, 18a (1976).
7. A comparison between the investigative capabilities provided by the Civil Investiga-
tive Demand of the Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (1976)) and the Proposal's Requests for infor-
mation (Art. 10) are beyond the scope of this article.
8. The hostile tender offer is becoming an increasingly important form of corporate in-
teraction in the international context. See, e.g., Goelzer, Mills, Gersham and Sullivan, The
Role of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in Transnational Acquisitions, 22 INT.
[Vol. 7:2
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fully or inadvertently (and perhaps disproportionately) favor either
the tender offeror or incumbent management in the battle for control
of a corporation. Regulation in this area necessarily implicates the
ultimate (American) goal of shareholder protection. This article,
therefore, will discuss the scope of the Proposal and its American
counterpart and will analyze their impact on hostile tender offers.
II. Scopes of Application
The Proposal's scope of application is far more restricted than
the scope of the Act. The tests and criteria under the Proposal and
its American counterpart create this difference.
A. Proposal Criteria
A combination must meet the monetary threshold of the Propo-
sal before the combination is subject to its regulation. 9 A concentra-
tion does not have a Community dimension unless the worldwide
gross sales are at least 1 billion ECU 10 and the aggregate communi-
tywide gross sales of at least two of the undertakings is more than
100 million ECU. 11
B. Act Criteria: 3 Part Test
In contrast, the Act has a three-part test, each part of which
must be met before the Act applies.' 2 The first prong, the "Com-
LAW. 615, 616 (1988).
9.
(1) This Regulation shall apply to all concentrations having a Community
dimension as defined in paragraph 2, whether or not they fall within the scope of
Article 85 or Article 86.
(2) For the purposes of this Regulation, a concentration has a Community
dimension where:
(a) the aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings con-
cerned is more than one thousand million ECU, and
(b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two
of the undertakings concerned is more than one hundred million ECU,
unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than three
quarters of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same
Member State.
The corresponding provision in the February proposal required that. concentrations have a su-
pranational Community dimension as defined in geographical terms; i.e., where at least two of
the undertakings involved had their principal field of community activities in a different Mem-
ber State of the European Community or at least one undertaking had substantial operations
in other Member States.
10. As of February 17, 1989, the ECU was worth $1.136, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1989, §
F, at 20.
11. Where more than 75% of the community-wide turnover occurs within one Member
State, the concentration is not within the scope of coverage of the Proposal. Article 1, § 2.
12. Except as-exempted pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, no person shall ac-
quire, directly or indirectly, any voting securities or assets of any other person, unless both
persons (or in the case of a tender offer, the acquiring person) file notification pursuant to rules
under subsection (d)(l) of this section and the waiting period described in subsection (b)(l) of
this section has expired, if -
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merce Test," is met if either the acquiring person or the acquired
person is engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting com-
merce.13 The administrative rules promulgated pursuant to the Act
define "commerce" as trade or commerce among the several states,
with foreign nations or between the District of Columbia or any ter-
ritory of the United States.1 This standard is extremely broad; few
transactions meeting the other threshold requirements will fail to
meet this test.
The second jurisdictional test is based on the size of the person.
This test considers the size of both the acquiror" and acquiree. Es-
sentially, this test is met when the manufacturer-acquiree has assets
or annual net sales' of $10,000,000 and the acquiror has assets or
annual net sales of $100,000,000 or more, when a non-manufactur-
ing acquiror has total assets or annual net sales of $100,000,000 or
more. Alternatively, the test is met when the securities of a company
(I) the acquiring person, or the person whose voting securities or assets are
being acquired, is engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce;
(2) (A) any voting securities or assets of a person engaged in manufactur-
ing which has annual net sales or total assets of $10,000,000 or more are being
acquired by any person which has total assets or annual net sales of
$100,000,000 or more;
(B) any voting securities or assets of a person not engaged in manufacturing
which has total' assets of $10,000,000 or more are being acquired by any person
which has total assets or annual net sales of $100,000,000 or more; or
(C) any voting securities or assets of a person with annual net sales or total
assets of $100,000,000 or more are being acquired by any person with total as-
sets or net sales of $10,000,000 or more; and
(3) as a result of such acquisition, the acquiring person would hold -
(A) 15 per centum or more of the voting securities or assets of the acquired
person, or
(B) an aggregate total amount of the voting securities and assets of the
acquired person in excess of $15,000,000.
15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (1984).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a)l (1984).
14. 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(1); 15 U.S.C. § 12; 15 U.S.C. § 44.
15. The acquiring person is the "ultimate parent entity" (i.e., entity not controlled by
any other entity. 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(a)(3) (1978)), including all the entities it directly or indi-
rectly owns or controls, that will have beneficial ownership of the assets or voting securities to
be acquired. The term "control" (as used in the terms "control(s)," "controlling," "controlled
by," and "under common control with") means:
(I) Either:
(i) Holding 50 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of
an issuer or
(ii) in the case of an entity that has no outstanding voting securities,
having the right to 50 percent or more of the profits of the entity, or
having the right in the event of dissolution to 50 percent or more of the
assets of the entity; or
(2) Having the contractual power presently to designate 50 percent or more
of the directors of a corporation, or in the case of unincorporated entities, of
individuals exercising similar functions.
16 C.F.R. § 801.1(b) (1978).
16. The Proposal does not differentiate between manufacturing and non-manufacturing
entities. Under the Act, for non-manufacturing acquirees, the $10 million figures is based only
on total assets. For manufacturing acquirees, either total assets or annual net sales are
considered.
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with annual net sales or total assets of $100,000,000 are acquired by
persons with total assets or annual net sales of $10,000,000.
The third and final test relates to the size of acquisition. Thus,
the Act applies where the acquiring person either acquires 15 % 17 of
the voting securities or assets or (b) the aggregate amount of voting
securities and assets of the acquired person exceeds $15 million."
Even though all three tests must be met to invoke the provisions of
the Act, it has applicability to a tremendous number of transactions.
C. Comparison of Scopes of Application
While the Act has been criticized because too many transac-
tions are subject to its notification requirements, 9 the Proposal
17. In addition the notification requirements are also triggered by incremental acquisi-
tions to 25% and 50% of the voting securities. 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(h) (1978).
18. There is, however, a "minimum dollar value exemption" which alters the prior
thresholds. If the acquiror received 15% of the voting securities or assets and as a result of the
acquisition holds assets valued at less than $15 million or voting securities controlling directly
or indirectly entities having annual net sales or total assets of less than $25 million, the acqui-
sition is exempt from the Act's notification requirements.
19. Note that the Act, unlike the Proposal, excludes a number of transactions from its
coverage. Although, for example, the exclusion for acquisition of goods or realty is rather
broad, on the whole, the Act's coverage is still generally much more limited in its scope of
application. For a discussion of the goods exemption, see Hayman, The Goods or Realty Ex-
emption to Premerger Notification Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act,
17 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. 477 (1983). The Act enumerates eleven categories of exempt
persons and acquisitions. Moreover, under the Act, the Federal Trade Commission, with the
concurrence of the Assistant Attorney General, may promulgate regulations that exempt other
classes of persons, acquisitions, transfers, or transactions "not likely to violate the anti-trust
laws." The rationale for these exemptions is that they are either considered to pose no substan-
tive antitrust problems or are already regulated under advanced antitrust review. In addition,
the inclusion of some of these categories might have wreaked havoc with the national economy.
AXINN FOGG & STOLL, ACQUISITIONS UNDER THE HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANTITRUST IM-
PROVEMENTS ACT 201 (1984).
15 U.S.C. § 18a(c) states:
The following classes of transactions are exempt from the requirements of
this section -
(I) acquisitions of goods or realty transferred in the ordinary course
of business;
(2) acquisitions of bonds, mortgages, deeds of trust, or other obliga-
tions which are not securities;
(3) acquisitions of voting securities of an issuer at least 50 per cen-
turn of the voting securities of which are owned by the acquiring person
prior to such acquisition;
(4) transfers to or from a Federal agency or a State or political sub-
division thereof;
(5) transactions specifically exempted from the antitrust laws by
Federal statute;
(6) transactions specifically exempted from the antitrust laws by
Federal statute if approved by a Federal agency, if copies of all informa-
tion and documentary material filed with such agency are contemporane-
ously filed with the Federal Trade Commission and the Assistant Attor-
ney General;
(7) transactions which require agency approval . . .
(8) transactions which require agency approval . . . if copies of all
information and documentary material filed with any such agency are
contemporaneously filed with the Federal Trade Commission and the As-
sistant Attorney General at least 30 days prior to the consummation of
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leaves numerous transactions unregulated. The sheer minimum size
necessary to trigger coverage is somewhat daunting. In the United
States, antitrust concerns could arise within certain markets or mar-
ket segments at far lower economic levels. In addition, if an Ameri-
can company with no prior Community exports were trying to enter
the Community Market by acquiring a primarily national product,
even though the combined value of this acquisition could be worth
billions of dollars, it would not be subject to regulation. Further-
more, transactions that are more likely to involve primarily a single
Member State or a major company of only one Member State, are
left unregulated at the community level.
By contrast, the Act's Commerce Test is far broader. The Pro-
posal, by its de facto exclusion of primarily national activities, leaves
open the possibility of additional Member State regulation of con-
centrations. Thus, the Proposal may promote Member State auton-
omy but possibly at the expense of uniformity in regulation, lower
administrative costs and greater security on the part of corporations;
in the vacuum left by the Proposal, various conflicting national en-
actments may be promulgated."
the proposed transaction;
(9) acquisitions, solely for the purpose of investment, of voting secur-
ities, if, as a result of such acquisition, the securities acquired or held do
not exceed 10 per centum of the outstanding voting securities of the
issuer;
(10) acquisitions of voting securities, if, as a result of such acquisi-
tion, the voting securities acquired do not increase, directly or indirectly,
the acquiring person's per centum share of outstanding voting securities
of the issuer;
(I1) acquisitions, solely for the purpose of investment, by any bank,
banking association, trust company, investment company, or insurance
company, of (A) voting securities pursuant to a plan of reorganization or
dissolution; or (B) assets in the ordinary course of its business; and
(12) such other acquisitions, transfers, or transactions, as may be
exempted [by the Federal Trade Commission].
20. Note, however, the Member States of the European Community retain far more
power than their American counterparts. Any legislation at all in this area may be with the
understanding of significant national control and the corresponding differences in national leg-
islation. Thus, Article 20, § 3 provides, "[M]ember States may take appropriate measures
where necessary to protect legitimate interests other than those pursued by this Regulation,
provided that such interests are sufficiently defined and protected in domestic law and that
such measures are compatible with other provisions of Community Law." The ability of Mem-
ber States to enact such measures was not made explicit in the February Proposal.
Moreover, Article 18, § 2 states:
2. The Commission shall carry out the procedures set out in this Regulation in
close and constant liaison with the competent authorities of the Member States,
which may express their views upon those procedures. It shall obtain the views of
the competent authorities of the Member States which show that they are di-
rectly concerned by the concentration, in particular with a view to the applica-
tion of Article 8(2).
The Revised Version of the Proposal also strenthened the position of the Member States
in this regard by requiring the Commission to obtain the views of the competent authorities of
the Member States where the Commission finds that the concentration is compatible with the
Common Market. Accordingly, the Revised version also provides in Article 8, § 2 that "[1]n
such a case, the Commission may also empower Member States which are directly concerned
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III. Treatment of Hostile Tender Offers
A more profound difference occurs in' the treatment of hostile
tender offers. Tender offers have a number of valuable effects; they
allow the reallocation of resources to their highest valued use, im-
prove efficiency and competition, scales of production, technical ca-
pacities, permit redeployment of assets to more profitable uses (all
synergistic-gains), 1 provide economic gains to shareholders, 2 allow
inefficient management to be replaced, and provide incentives to in-
cumbent management to perform well enough to keep stock prices
high.2 3 Target management, however, may adopt tactics which in
some cases do not impact negatively on shareholders.2 4 The possibil-
ity remains that management may be acting primarily to entrench
itself. Moreover, the difficulties of proving such entrenchment (on
account of, inter alia, the protection afforded by the "Business Judg-
ment Rule") 25 may actually encourage management in this regard.
A. Treatment Under the Act
The Act was drafted in recognition of the importance of not
"tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of management or
in favor of the persons making the takeover bid." The Act's
mandatory acquisition waiting period (time after which an acquisi-
tion or merger has been notified but is forbidden to take effect) was
by the concentration to apply their national legislation on competition in order to ensure condi-
tions of effective competition in local markets within their respective territories."
21. See, e.g., Mitchell and Lehn, "Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets," Office of
Economic Analysis, Securities and Exchange Commission, 28-29 (August 25, 1988); Antitrust
Guidelines for International Operations, 58 Fed. Reg. 21588 (1988); Note, The Constitution-
ality of Second Generation Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 203, 232 (1987); Bradley,
Desai & Kim, The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offers: Information or Synergy?, II J.
FIN. EcoN. 183, 184 (1983); Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1031-32 (1982). But see, Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of
Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 24 (1987) ("The current wave of takeover activity
has caused both raider and target to expend enormous resources on inherently non-productive
activity.").
22. See, e.g., Black & Grundfest, Shareholder Gains from Takeovers and Restructur-
ings Between 1981 and 1986, I J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 5, 6 (1988); Jarrell, Brickley, & Netter,
The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. OF ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES 49 (1988).
23. See, e.g., Antitrust Guidelines, 58 Fed. Reg. 21588 (1988); Gilson, A Structural
Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 819, 841-42 (1983); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1173-74 (1981); Fischel, Efficient
Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash
Tender Offers, 57 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 5 (1978).
24. See, e.g., Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1377, 1414-17 (1986); Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Green-
mail, 95 YALE L.J. 13, 47-48 (1985).
25. See, for example, Shamrock Holding Inc. v. Polaroid Corporation, 1989 WL 1156
(Del. Ch. 1989); Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. Ch.
1985).
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promulgated with this goal of neutrality in mind.26
Under the Act, an acquiring corporation making a cash tender
offer must wait only fifteen days after notification before the acquisi-
tion can take place." This short period of time is essential to the
success of hostile tender offers. Otherwise, with a prolonged period
of notice, management is given so much advanced warning that take-
overs cannot succeed. Delay28 is a potent weapon of management in
a tender offer fight. Delay allows management to devise various
counter-measures with varying impacts on the transaction; i.e., these
include management's ability to develop special voting plans unfa-
vorable to potential acquirors ("poison pills")' sell attractive com-
pany assets (the "crown jewels"); 30 find bidders it views more favor-
ably ("white knights");31 repurchase its own stock;32 provide
premium payments in reacquiring stock from the acquirors ("green-
mail");33 announce dividend increases; stock splits; issue additional
shares; acquire other companies to create an antitrust violation for
the acquiror; create Employee Stock Option Plans to put votes in the
hands of friendly shareholders;3 ' and bring litigation to challenge the
offer.3 5 Furthermore, delay allows target management the time to
26. Supra note 19, AXINN, FOGG & STOLL, ACQUISITIONS, at 51.
27. The process may, however, be delayed 10 days (in the case of a cash tender offer) by
an information request to the target corporation. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e)2 (1984).
28. Bebchuk, supra note 19, at 1054, sustains that there may be some benefits from
delay because it allows competing offers that are desirable for both shareholders and society.
Bebchuk, however, recognizes that in order for a delay to produce these competitive benefits,
management must be prevented from adopting obstructionist tactics or using a competitive
offer to avoid a takeover altogether or keeping itself entrenched.
29. For recent cases in which the Supreme Court of Delaware ordered the removal of
poison pills, see City Capital Associates Limited Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787
(1988); Grand Metropolitan Public Limited Co. v. Pillsbury Co., Nos. 10319, 10323 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 16, 1988) (WESTLAW Allstate Library, Del. file); Mills Acquisition v. MacMillan Inc.,
Nos. 415-16 (Del. Super. Nov. 2, 1988) (WESTLAW Allstates library, Del. file). See also,
Poison Pills as Negatiating Tool. Seeking a Cease-Fire in the Corporate Takeover Wars,
1987 COLUM. Bus. LAW 459, 463-64 (1987); Helman & Junewicz, A Fresh Look at Poison
Pills, 42 Bus. LAW 771 (1987).
30. House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Equity in Foreign and Domestic Credit,
Credit and Tender Offer Reform, H.R. Rep. 1028, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 7 n.8 (1984); Cottle v.
Storer Communication, 849 F.2d 570 (11th Cir. 1988).
31. Gillette Co. v. RB Partners, 693 F. Supp. 1266, 1271 (D. Mass. 1988); Mobil Cor-
poration v. Marathon Oil Company, 669 F.2d 366, 367-68 (6th Cir. 1981), 455 U.S. 982
(1982).
32. This may be accomplished through a "Dutch Auction" where management tries to
buy out the bidder, e.g., Pennwalt Corporation v. Centaur Partners, Civ. Act. No. 88-5146,
slip. op. at 3-4 (Feb. 10, 1989, J. Gawthrop).
33. Hartnett, Greenmail: Can the Abuses be Stopped, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1271 (1986);
Note, Greenmail: Targeted Stock Repurchases and the Management Entrenchment Hypothe-
sis, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1988).
34. See Brecher, Lazarus & Gray, The Function of Employee Retirement Plans as an
Impediment to Takeovers, 38 Bus. LAW. 503, 510 (1983). See also Shamrock Holding Inc. v.
Polaroid Corporation, Nos. 10075, 10079 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 1989) (WESTLAW, All States
Library, Del. file).
35. For an analysis critical of target litigation, see Rosenzweig, Target Litigation, 85
MICH. L. REV. 110 (1986); but see Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do
Interests Diverge in a Merge?, 28 J. L. & ECON., 151, 174-75 (April 1985).
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attempt to persuade local legislators to promulgate or accelerate ap-
plicable anti-takeover laws.
B. Coordination with the Williams Act
The Act and its timing provisions are, to a large extent, coordi-
nated with the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(e), 78 n(d)(f)3 B
which regulates the tender offer process in the United States."7 Con-
gress intended to protect investors by promulgating the Williams Act
regulations."8 The Williams Act requires that bidders make full and
fair disclosure to investors of the terms and conditions of their offers
and imposes several requirements. 3  The Securities and Exchange
Commission, the American agency charged with administering the
Williams Act, has also adopted a number of requirements to insure
the equal treatment of all investors in tender offers.4"
36. LIPTON & STEINBERG, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS, PRACTICAL IMPACT OF THE
ANTITRUST LAWS ON TAKEOVERS, § 7.02(5)(b)(ii) (1988).
37. In 1968 Congress passed the Williams Act in response to the increased use of cash
tender offers in corporate acquisitions. Prior to that time, the Federal securities laws did not
cover these transactions.
38. As stated in Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624 (1982):
[i]t is also crystal clear that a major aspect of the effort to protect the investors
was to avoid favoring either management or the takeover bidder . . . . [tihe
disclosure provisions originally embodied [in the Senate Bill] "were avowedly
pro-management in the target company's efforts to defeat takeover bids." ...
But Congress became convinced "that takeover bids should not be discouraged
because they serve a useful purpose in providing a check on entrenched but inef-
ficient management." ... It also became apparent that entrenched management
was often successful in defeating takeover attempts. As the legislation evolved,
therefore, Congress disclaimed any "intention to provide a weapon for manage-
ment to discourage takeover bids ...and expressly embraced a policy of neu-
trality." As Senator Williams explained: "We have taken extreme care to avoid
tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor of the person mak-
ing the takeover bids." ... This policy of "evenhandedness," ... represented a
conviction that neither side in the contest should be extended additional advan-
tages vis-A-vis the investor, who if furnished with adequate information would be
in a position to make his own informed choice.
457 U.S. at 633-34.
39. The Williams Act, inter alia, requires that a tender offeror, for more than 5% of a
class of equity securities registered under the Securities and Exchange Commission Act of
1934, upon the commencement of the offer, file with the Securities and Exchange Commission
and provide to investors information about the offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1983). The offeror
must disclose information about its background and identity; the source and amount of the
funds to be used in making the purchase; the purpose of making the purchase, including plans
to acquire control, liquidate the company or make major changes in its corporate structure; the
extent of the offeror's beneficial or direct holdings in the target company; and contracts, ar-
rangements or understandings concerning the acquisition and financial statements of certain
bidders. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1982). Stockholders who tender their shares may withdraw
them at any time as long as the tender offer remains open. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a) (1982).
The bidder must hold the offer open at least 20 business days so that shareholders can ade-
quately consider the disclosures he may have made. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1982). Finally,
all shares tendered must be offered for the same price; if an offering price is increased, those
who have already tendered must receive the benefit of the increase. If the offeror does not buy
all the shares tendered, his purchase must be on a pro rata basis. 15 U.S.C. §78n(d)(6)(7)
(1983).
40. E.g., an offer must be made to all holders of the class of securities at which the offer
is directed and all security holders must receive the same price. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100
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In describing the relationship between the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act and the Williams Act, Representative Rodino discussed the con-
cerns over undue delay that were central to both legislative
enactments:
In the case of cash tender offers, more so than in other
mergers, the equities include time and the danger of undue de-
lay. This bill in no way intends to repeal or reverse the congres-
sional purpose underlying the 1968 Williams Act, or the 1970
amendments to that act . . . Lengthier delays will give the
target firm plenty of time to defeat the offer, by abolishing cu-
mulative voting, arranging a speedy defensive merger, quickly
• . . negotiating costly lifetime employment contracts for incum-
bent management. And the longer the waiting period, the more
the target's stock may be bid up in the market, making the offer
more costly - and less successful. Should this happen, it will
mean that shareholders of the target firm will be effectively de-
prived of the choice that cash tenders give to them: either accept
the offer and thereby gain the tendered premium, or reject the
offer. Generally, the courts have construed the Williams Act so
as to maintain these two options for the target company's share-
holders, and the House conferees contemplate that the courts
will continue to do so."
C. Treatment Under the Proposal
Under the Proposal, however, the Commission normally may
commence proceedings one month after the receipt of notification.42
This period may be even longer if the information is incomplete. The
Proposal does not specify the notification duties of a target corpora-
tion, but one Wonders to what extent incomplete filing can further
delay the procedure. In recognition of the special circumstances of
hostile tender offers, a special provision has been proposed that al-
lows the merger to go through provided that the acquirer does not
exercise the voting rights attached to the shares in question. This is a
remarkable provision from an American federal perspective in light
of the timing requirements imposed by the United States federal sys-
tem - primarily the Act and the Williams Act along with the regu-
lations promulgated thereunder - and the previously discussed poli-
cies therefor. Such restrictions on the voting rights of an acquiror
are incompatible with existing federal legislation.
(1982).
41. 122 CONG. REC. 30877 (1976).
42. 457 U.S. at 631 n.6.
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D. State Anti-takeover Statutes
State anti-takeover statutes have often conflicted with the afore-
mentioned federal policy. In the late 1970s, individual states began
to pass laws to hinder hostile tender offers. The state legislation
arose from the belief that a successful tender offer often results in a
reorganization of the target company which, in turn, leads to plant
closings and relocations, reduces local employment and diminishes
the local tax base. States moved to protect their local economies. By
the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE43 in
1982, thirty-seven states had enacted such laws.
In Edgar v. MITE, the United States Supreme Court held the
Illinois Business Takeover Act unconstitutional, inter alia, because it
violated the Supremacy Clause. The Illinois Act required a tender
offeror to notify the Illinois Secretary of State and the target com-
pany of its intent to make a tender offer twenty days before the offer
became effective. A target company was defined to include a corpo-
ration with Illinois shareholders owning 10% of the class of securi-
ties subject to the bid, or two of the following three conditions: (1)
either its principal office in Illinois; (2) organized under Illinois law;
or (3) 10% of its paid surplus represented within the state. More-
over, the Secretary of State could call a hearing to adjudicate the
fairness of the offer. MITE, the tender offeror, did not comply with
this law and challenged its constitutionality in federal court. The Su-
preme Court, in a plurality opinion found preemption by the Wil-
liams Act and stated:
[A] major aspect of the effort to protect the investor was to
avoid favoring either management or the takeover bidder ....
As the legislation evolved, therefore, Congress disclaimed any
"intention to provide a weapon for management to discourage
takeover bids" . . . and expressly embraced a policy of neutral-
ity. As Senator Williams explained: "We have taken extreme
care to avoid tipping the scales either in favor of management or
in favor of the persons represented making the takeover bids"
... . This policy of "evenhandedness" . . . represented a con-
viction that neither side in the contest should be extended addi-
tional advantages vis-a-vis the investor, who if furnished with
adequate information would be in a position to make his own
informed choice. We, therefore, agree with the Court of Appeals
that Congress sought to protect the investor not only by furnish-
ing him with the necessary information but also by withholding
from management or the bidder any undue advantage that could
frustrate the exercise of an informed choice.4
43. 457 U.S. at 624 (1984).
44. 457 U.S. at 633-34.
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In CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of America,45 the United States Su-
preme Court faced another state law which appeared to present a far
more oblique conflict with the Williams Act. The Indiana law in
question applied to any corporation incorporated in Indiana and
with: (1) one hundred or more shareholders; (2) its principal place of
business, its principal office, or substantial assets within Indiana; and
(3) either (a) more than 10% of its shareholders resident in Indiana,
(b) more than 10% of its shares owned by Indiana residents, or (c)
10,000 shareholders resident in Indiana. Under the Indiana statute,
an entity acquiring control shares did not necessarily receive voting
rights. A majority vote of all disinterested shareholders at a special
meeting within 50 days was necessary to pass such rights. Manage-
ment could not enact such a provision. The acquiring party had to
convince the disinterested shareholders of his own merits. The ac-
quiring party challenged the constitutionality of this law.
In CTS, the Court found that the Williams Act did not preempt
the Indiana statute. The Court distinguished the facts of MITE and
its plurality preemption rationale, but noted that, even applying its
rationale, no preemption would have been found:
[T]he overriding concern of the MITE plurality was that the
Illinois statute considered in that case operated to favor manage-
ment against offerors, to the detriment of shareholders. By con-
trast, the statute now before the Court protects the independent
shareholder against both of the contending parties. Thus, the
Act furthers a basic purpose of the Williams Act, "plac[ing] in-
vestors on an equal footing with the takeover bidder" . . . .
The desire of the Indiana Legislature to protect sharehold-
ers of Indiana corporations from [two tier] coercive offers does
not conflict with the Williams Act. Rather, it furthers the fed-
eral policy of investor protection.
In implementing its goal, the Indiana Act avoids the
problems the plurality discussed in MITE. Unlike the MITE
statute, the Indiana Act does not give either management or the
offeror an advantage in communicating with the shareholders
about the impending offer . . .- 6
As long as the basic goal of shareholder protection was still intact,
the Indiana Act was allowed to promote its own legitimate interests,
such as internal corporate regulation. When the state tilts the play-
ing field too drastically, however, the result may be unconstitu-
tional.4 Although in CTS the Supreme Court implicitly accepted
45. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
46. Note, however, there is support for the proposition that this type of statute does not
promote shareholder wealth. See Hackl & Testani, Second Generation Takeover Statutes and
Shareholder Wealth: An Empirical Study, 97 YALE L.J. 1193, 1228 (1988).
47. For a recent case holding a state statute unconstitutional because of its adverse im-
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that hostile tender offers are not a pure benefit, its announced policy
of shareholder protection assumes certain benefits inherent in hostile
tender offers and the Court did not relinquish control over the of-
feror/management playing field, nor did it deny the economic bene-
fits of all hostile tender offers.48 Individual states are not given free
reign to distort the federal policies of evenhanded regulation and in-
vestor protection.
IV. Theoretical Effects of the Proposal
The goals of the Proposal include improving production and dis-
tribution, promoting technical or economic progress, and correspond-
ingly the Commission is requested to analyze the transaction with a
view to promoting the ability to compete internationally. Objections
to hostile tender offers, however, arise from different concerns, i.e.,
protection of local interests such as avoiding cultural or social dislo-
cation from plant closings, corporate restructurings, layoffs, etc. In
Europe, management is also often seen as a more stable community
force than shareholders who are thought to consider only their own
pecuniary gains. These concerns, however, conflict to some extent
with the stated purposes of the Proposal. Moreover, it is even possi-
ble that the long term competitive benefits of takeovers will actually
promote these goals. If companies outside the Community act con-
tinually to strengthen their competitive capacities, advanced in part
by hostile takeovers, with Community companies protected from
these synergistic combinations, then the increased competitive abili-
ties of extra-community companies may begin to take jobs away
from Community companies as they compete in the same markets.
A. Management Advantages
The Proposal greatly benefits management during the period it
takes the Commission to make its decision and the Proposal provides
no significant investor protection. The acquiror cannot exercise the
voting rights of the stock it acquires until the end of the more
lengthy Commission decision period.' 9 Even actions which the Com-
mission might approve and that have no anti-competitive effects will
be necessarily delayed, e.g., retooling to meet the increased competi-
tion of 1992. Accordingly, hostile tender offers may be dramatically
discouraged. The shareholders can be prevented from deciding
pact on tender offers, see RTE v. Mark IV, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93789, 722 (May 6,
1988).
48. For a discussion of the ramifications of this decision on takeover legislation, see
Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HARV. L. REV. 96 (1987).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(l) (1984).
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whether they wish to accept a tender offer. Management, with the
possibility of considering only its own interest, is given the luxury of
time to defend itself in whatever way it chooses. There may be little
consideration for the best interest of the company and shareholders
as a whole. Moreover, although the Proposal protects national auton-
omy by setting threshold limits high enough so that the bulk of na-
tional transactions are not subject to community-wide reporting re-
quirements, in these really important acquisitions it potentially
precludes Members States from reaping the competitive advantages
of beneficial tender offers; hostile acquisitions are discouraged
throughout the Community.
Furthermore, the advantage to management is compounded by
a second feature of the Proposal. Under the Act, the waiting period
begins to run on the date the tender offeror has filed with the Fed-
eral Trade Commission and the Justice Department;50 according to
the regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act, the target corpora-
tion must file within ten days thereafter.51 Under the Proposal, the
one month period within which the Commission begins its proceed-
ings may run from the day following the receipt of complete infor-
mation, so that the waiting period does not automatically run from
the initial filing. If all the necessary information is not provided by
the offeror, the Commission may not be able fully to evaluate the
concentration until the target corporation has also filed. There is no
requirement that the target corporation file its information within a
specific time. Although the acquiring entity may often be able to
provide the necessary information, in certain cases the target may be
able to delay the completion of a takeover for an undefined, and pos-
sibly lengthy amount of time.52 The acquiror cannot acquire full vot-
50. 16 C.F.R. § 801.30(b)(2) (1978).
51. Article 6, § 3 provides:
As regards notified concentrations, decisions pursuant to paragraphs I and
2 shall be taken within a period not exceeding one month, unless the undertak-
ings concerned agree to extend that period. The period of one month shall com-
mence on the day following the date of receipt of the notification, or if the infor-
mation to be supplied with the notification is incomplete, on the day following
the date of receipt of the complete information.
52. Article 7, § 3 provides: "3. The provisions of paragraphs I and 2 shall not impede
the implementation of a public takeover or exchange bid which has been notified to the Com-
mission by the date of its announcement, provided that the acquirer does not exercise the
voting rights attached to the shares in question." Article 7, § 4 does, however, provide some
somewhat uncertain relief in this regard. It states:
The Commission may, on request, waive the provisions of paragraphs I and
2 or the proviso contained in paragraph 3 in order to prevent serious damage to
one or more undertakings concerned by a concentration; the waiver may be
made subject to conditions and obligations in order to ensure conditions of effec-
tive competition."
Moreover, the full scope of the term "voting rights" may not yet be determined. For example,
is the call of a special meeting of shareholders an action by written consent or the petition to
amend the Bylaws of a corporation the exercise of a voting right?
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ing rights until this waiting period is over.
B. Proposal's Silver Lining
The Proposal, however, may solve one former aberration of the
hostile tender offer process in the United States. Previously, hostile
tender offerors often formed special partnerships in order to avoid
the notification and waiting requirements of the Act. Such avoidance
was possible, in part, because a partnership was considered its own
"ultimate parent entity." Ownership of the partnership was not
traced back to the controlling partners. Accordingly, the assets of
the partners were not considered in arriving at the Act's threshold
requirements. Moreover, accounting principles embodied within the
Act's regulation, did not consider assets contributed to the partner-
ship solely for the purpose of making an acquisition as assets of the
partnership. 3 Thus, even though huge conglomerates may have
formed the partnership and contributed large sums of money for an
acquisition, the partnerships might not have been considered to meet
the threshold requirements for compliance with the Act. These part-
nerships, therefore, would have special advantages in certain take-
over contests; they would be the only ones not subject to the waiting
periods imposed by the Act where the Act's requirements differed
from those of the Williams Act. In the Spring of 1987, the definition
of control54 provided by the Regulations was changed to regulate
these transactions. Partnerships were no longer considered to be in-
dependent entities and controlling partners were required to fulfill
the reporting requirements.5" A hostile corporation, therefore, is not
permitted to form a shell partnership for an acquisition to avoid re-
porting requirements.
The terms employed by the Proposal will also apply to these
situations so that a person will not be able to avoid its application
through adopting a particular form of corporate organization. The
Proposal applies to undertakings which acquire direct or indirect
control of the whole or parts of one or more undertakings.5 6 The
partnership loopholes that previously flourished in the United States
53. Note, the Act had made a trade-off in this regard. Under the Act, there is an abso-
lute bar on effecting a hostile tender offer until the waiting period is over; the Proposal allows
the merger to proceed, subject to the voting rights limitation. The effect of the Act's absolute
bar, however, is minimal because the waiting period's duration for the most part lies within the
waiting period mandated by the Williams Act itself.
54. 52 Fed. Reg. 20060-61 (1987).
55. See 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(b), supra note 14.
56. 52 Fed. Reg. 20060-61 (1987). Note also that transactions which appear to be de-
vices effective to avoid reporting requirements are examined for their substantive effects. 16
C.F.R. § 801.90 states: "Any transaction(s) or other devise(s) entered into or employed for the
purpose of avoiding the obligation to comply with the requirements of the act shall be disre-
garded, and the obligation to comply shall be determined by applying the act and these rules
to the substance of the transaction."
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are closed. The Proposal arrives at its threshold requirements by to-
talling the turnover of all the undertakings concerned. 57 Thus, the
annual net sales of the controlling partners of partnerships is in-
cluded in the calculations for the threshold figures for triggering no-
tification. 58 Of course, the rather substantial requirements must be
met before "control" can be attributed in this manner.
V. Alternative Measures Outside the Proposal
There are several less restrictive measures which the Proposal
might adopt in order to avoid favoring management. The first alter-
native would be to adopt an accelerated decision-making process for
hostile tender offers, or perhaps to allow them to go through pending
a preliminary answer by the Commission. The Act has favored this
first alternative. The disadvantage to this approach is that the Com-
mission loses the ability to evaluate as thoroughly as possible the
anti-competitive aspects of the acquisition. A tentative decision
which is later reversed may also have significant negative conse-
quences to the companies involved. Moreover, it may take the Com-
mission more time to reach a decision because it must also evaluate
if the acquisition helps attain the basic objectives of the Community.
Further, the Revised Version of the Proposal is a significant im-
provement in this regard, as it shortened the Commission's original
decisional time period from two months to one month.
A second possibility is to place a freeze on the defensive tactics
that management can enact during this waiting period. 59 Manage-
ment might be prohibited from adopting poison pills, selling the
crown jewels, granting greenmail, etc. It may be difficult to legislate
against all possible defensive activities since innovative tactics de-
velop quite rapidly in this area. This suggestion, however, would at
least reduce management's tremendous advantages; it would not nec-
essarily guarantee the success of a hostile tender offer. While such
measures may distort to some extent the terrain of the battle be-
tween the offeror and management, neither side would be favored so
dramatically.
These two alternatives represent the manner in which the Pro-
posal could be adapted to be consistent with the American policy in
this field. Both alternatives promote the ultimate American goal of
shareholder protection. Although there are several major negative
aspects to hostile tender offers, opposition to these offers by govern-
57. Article 3, supra note 2.
58. Article 1, supra note 9.
59. In Article VII of its "13th Council Directive On Companies Concerning Takeovers
and General Bids," (Jan. 9, 1989), The Commission places several restrictions by the target
corporation's board of directors during their tender offer. O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 64) (1989).
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ment entities is more often seen in the United States where states
believe they are acting to protect their local interests."° Hostile
tender offers are not generally attacked because they all interfere
with shareholder interests. Thus, a certain balance has been main-
tained between the tender offerors and target management.
VI. Conclusion
The ultimate stated purpose of the Proposal is not to protect
shareholders, but to promote competition. Yet, as with promoting
shareholder interests, hostile tender offers are also viewed as a means
of reaching this latter aim because of their synergistic possibilities. It
is indeed curious that with the avowed goals of increased efficiency
and preparing for international competition, the Proposal so signifi-
cantly disfavors a device whose greatest benefits may lie in this area.
The efficiency aspects of takeovers are the very goals the Proposal
sets for itself in preparing for 1992. The Proposal contains an inher-
ent conflict between the explicit goal of increased competitive ability
and the tacit goal of continued corporate stability. Discouraging all
hostile tender offers may promote short term corporate and social
stability. It is arguable, however, whether these benefits outweigh the
long term potential advantages of increased competitive capacity.
60. This is explainable, in part, because the management of local corporations may be
best able to defend itself through the auspices of local political powers.
Winter 1989]

